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SOMETHING ABOUT "CARRY": SUPREME
COURT BROADENS THE SCOPE OF
18 U.S.C. § 924(C).
Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Muscarello v. United States,' the Supreme Court held that
the phrase "carries a firearm" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1)2 "applies to a person who knowingly possesses and
conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove
compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompa-
nies."3 Rejecting the argument that "carries" applies only to
firearms carried on the person, the Court reasoned that the
statutory language and legislative history of § 924 supported the
application of the statute to firearms "carried" in vehicles as
well.'
This Note argues that the Court properly expanded the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1) to include guns "carried" in ve-
hicles during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes.5 The
Note explains how the text and policy goals of § 924 justify the
Court's holding.6 In addition, this Note discusses a double
standard created by the Muscarello decision, which results in
stricter punishments for defendants who "carry" guns in a vehi-
cle than for those who store guns nearby in a non-vehicular
'118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994), which provides for a mandatory five-year pen-
alty enhancement for one who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime."
'Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1913.
'Id. at 1913-20.
'See infra Part V.
6id.
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situation.7 Ultimately, this Note concludes that amending 18
U.S.C. § 924 to replace the language "uses or carries a firearm"
with the phrase "possesses a firearm" would solve the double
standard created by Muscarello.8
II. BACKGROUND
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 924 (C) (1)
Federal law mandates a minimum five-year sentence en-
hancement for anyone who, "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... uses or carries a
firearm."9 This law, when originally adopted as part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, did not initially reach drug crimes. In
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 924 provided that,
(c) Whoever -
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any fel-
ony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one
year nor more than 10 years.'
In 1984, Congress amended the statute by changing the
scope from "any felony" to "any crime of violence."" In addi-
tion, it combined the "use" and "carry" provisions, and added
the "during and in relation to" language. 2  The amendment
also eliminated the requirement that the firearm be carried "un-
7id.
8 Id.
'18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
,Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 924, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994)). See Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 147 (1995).
" Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98
Stat. 2138, 2138-39. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)-(2) (1984), amended by U.S.C. §
924 (c)(1) (1994)). See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 147.
,2 Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 1005 (a); see Bailey, 516 U.S. at 147.
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lawfully," and increased the mandatory minimum sentence from
one year to five. 3
In 1986, Congress specifically added drug trafficking as a
predicate offense under the Firearm Owners' Protection Act.1
4
This amendment corrected confusion in the courts of appeals
about whether drug trafficking constituted a "crime of violence"
under the statute.' 5 The Attorney General's Office requested
that Congress further amend the language of § 924 to include
drug crimes in light of the fact that "criminals involved in drug
trafficking may often carry or use firearms during the commis-
sion of drug-related felonies."'6 Congress complied.7  The new
language made clear Congress's desire to "treat armed drug
" Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 1005(a); see Bailey, 516 U.S. at 147. The
new version read:
(c) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence, including a crime of
violence which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a
deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such crime of violence, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. In the
case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection such person shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted
of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that im-
posed for the crime of violence in which the firearm was used or carried. No person
sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term of impris-
onment imposed herein.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 1005(a), 98 Stat. at 2138-39. See also Kristin
Whiting, The Aftermath of Bailey v. United States: Should Possession Replace Carry and Use
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)?, 5J.L. & PoL'Y679, 685-86 (1997).
" 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994). See generally Alan M. Gilbert, Note: Defining "Use"
of a Firearm, 87J. CRaM. L. & CRrMINOLOGY 842 (1997).
's See 131 CONG. REC. S16,903 (1985) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see also U.S. v.
Diaz, 778 F.2d 86, 88 (2nd Cir. 1985) (holding that § 924 (c) (1) does not apply to
narcotics offenses).
6 132 Cong. Rec. S 7941 (1986) (letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney
General, to Sen. Bumpers).
'7 Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a) (2) (A)-(E),
100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986). The amendment added "or drug trafficking crime" be-
fore "in which the firearm was used or carried." Id.; see also Whiting, supra note 13, at
687 n.28.
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trafficking as seriously as we do other armed felonies threaten-
ing public safety.'
B. JUDICIAL NARROWING OF THE "USE" PRONG
The circuit courts of appeals did not agree on the proper
interpretation of the term "uses" within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1).
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. circuits applied a "drug fortress" theory,
premised on the idea that firearms on the premises could be
used to protect drugs and cash, thereby creating a "drug for-
tress."' 9 In contrast, the Second and Third Circuits used a
"ready access theory," under which the possessor of the firearm
"used" the weapon if he either intended to have it available for
possible use during the crime or had it "strategically located so
as to be quickly and easily available for use during such a trans-
action."2°
s 131 Cong. Rec. S16903 (1985) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). Congress amended
§ 924 eight times between 1968 and 1997. See Whiting, supra note 13, at 682 n.12 for
a comprehensive listing. Included here are amendments relevant to this discussion.
" See United States v. Nelson, 6 F.Sd 1049, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding guns were
"used" when located in same room as drugs); United States v. Travis, 993 F.2d 1316,
1321 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding defendant "used" weapons in locked glove compart-
ment, even though he did not own car or have key to compartment); United States v.
Harmon, 996 F.2d 256, 258 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding firearm used or carried when it
protects drugs or emboldens defendant); United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976,
983 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming defendant's conviction on theory he "used" unloaded
firearm stored in trunk with cash when he used car to pick up drugs); United States v.
Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding "use" can occur without actual
employment of a firearm); United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361, 1366 (6th Cir.
1991) (finding shotgun in same apartment with crack cocaine constituted use);
United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that de-
fendant "used" weapon stored in tunnel beneath house, even though defendant was a
paraplegic and could not retrieve weapon himself); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d
1105, 1111 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirmed conviction of defendant who used keys to enter
driver's side of car where drugs and firearm were stored under seat); United States v.
Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that presence of weapons in lo-
cation where defendant distributed drugs sufficient to constitute "use"); United States
v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417, 1424 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that physical prox-
imity of drugs and firearms on premises is sufficient to qualify as "use"). See generally
Gilbert, supra note 14, at 845 n.24; Jamilla A. Moore, Comment: These Are Drugs. These
Are Drugs Using Guns. Any Questions? An Analysis of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), 30 CAL.
W. L. REV. 179, 180 n.4 (1993).
" United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that
gun in dresser drawer with drugs, in apartment, did not constitute "use" under §
"CARRY!NG" A ETREARM
The Supreme Court first interpreted the "use" language of
18 U.S.C. § 924 to determine whether bartering guns for drugs
constituted "use" of a firearm.2' The Circuits were split on the
issue.2' The Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the
District of Columbia Circuit held that using a gun as barter in a
drug trade constituted "using a firearm" in relation to a drug
crime under § 924(c) (1).2s The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, held
that trading a gun during a drug transaction did not qualify as
using a firearm in relation to the drug offense.24
In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court held that trad-
ing a gun in exchange for drugs constitutes "use" under 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1).25 The petitioner in Smith argued that be-
cause he had not "fired the MAC-10, threatened anyone with it,
or employed it for self-protection" he had not actually "used"
the firearm under § 924.26 Persuaded by the petitioner's argu-
ments, the dissent found that "to use an instrumentality ordinar-
ily means to use it for its intended purpose. 27
The Court, however, interpreted the word "use" more
broadly, and reasoned that the fact "that one example of 'use' is
the first to come to mind when the phrase 'uses... a firearm' is
uttered does not preclude us from recognizing that there are
924). See also United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3rd Cir.
1989) (holding that gun in plain view constituted use). See generally Gilbert, supra note
14, at 845 n. 25.
21 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
2 Compare Smith v. United States, 957 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
any use of a weapon, including use of weapon as barter, that facilitates the commis-
sion of the predicate offense constitutes "use" under § 924); and United States v. Har-
ris, 959 F.2d 246, 261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same), with United States v. Phelps, 877
F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that trading a gun during a drug transaction does
not constitute "use" under § 924). See also Gilbert, supra note 14, at 846; Julie D. Bet-
tenhausen, The Implications of Bailey v. United States on the Rise of Convicted Criminal
Claims and the Fall of U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 46 DRAKE L. REv. 677, 682-85 (1998); Jeffrey R.
Kesselman, Note: Excuse Me, Are You "Using" That Gun? The United States Supreme Court
Examines 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in Bailey v. United States, 30 CREiGHTON L. Rzv. 513,
526-35 (1997); Moore, supra note 20, at 180-93.
23 Smith, 957 F.2d at 837; Harris, 959 F.2d at 261-62.
2'4 Phelps, 877 F.2d at 30.
"Smith, 508 U.S. at 237.
Id. at 228.
27 Id. at 242 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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other 'uses' that qualify as well., 28 According to the Court, the
"petitioner 'used' his MAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by
offering to trade it for cocaine," and thus "used" a weapon in re-
lation to a drug offense in violation of § 924.2 The Smith deci-
sion clarified that a defendant did not have to use a firearm in a
traditional sense-for example, by brandishing or firing it-to
have "used" it under § 924.0
Two years after the Smith decision, the Court significantly
narrowed the scope of the "use" language in Bailey v. United
States. 3' In a unanimous decision, the Court held that "to sus-
tain a conviction under the 'use' prong of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1), the Government must show that the defendant ac-
tively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predi-
cate crime.3 2 The Supreme Court rejected the accessibility and
proximity test, and instead held that in order to sustain a con-
viction under § 924, one must show "active employment" of a
firearm in a manner that "makes the firearm an operative factor
in relation to the predicate offense."3 The Court based its con-
clusion on "the language, context, and history" of § 924. The
Court went on to define active employment as including "bran-
dishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously,
firing or attempting to fire a firearm," as well as "a reference to
Id. at 230.
2Id..
s Id. at 231 (rejecting dissent's argument that only the use of a firearm for its in-
tended purposes-to be "discharged... brandished, displayed, or possessed"-falls
within the scope of§ 924).
3" Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
32 Id. at 150 (emphasis added). The Court reviewed two cases in Bailey. one in-
volved guns stored in the trunk of an automobile and the other addressed an un-
loaded firearm locked in a footlocker in the defendant's bedroom closet. Id. at 137.
See United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Robinson,
997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
The Court of Appeals, after consolidating the cases, employed an "accessibility and
proximity" test, holding that "one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and there-
fore violates [§ 924(c) (1)], whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place
from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate
a drug crime. Bailey v. United States, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Using this test, the Court of Appeals affirmed both defendants' convictions. Bailey, 36
F.3d at 117.
"Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143.
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a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circum-
stances of the predicate offense."34
This definition of "use," the Court reasoned, "preserves a
meaningful role for 'carries' as an alternative basis for a
charge."3 A broader definition of "use" would have left virtually
no meaning for "carry"-if any gun put into place near a drug
crime constituted "use," the "carry" prong would be unneces-
sary.3 The presence of the gun on the scene would satisfy the
use prong, whether the defendant "carried" the gun or not;
therefore, a defendant could never "carry" but not "use" a fire-
arm.37 The Court assumed that Congress "intended each term
to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning," and thus found
a narrower definition of "use" necessary to preserve the weight
of the "carry" language.8
C. POST-BArLEYJUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE "CARRY- PRONG
The Court remanded Bailey for consideration under the
carry prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924. However, lower courts differed
greatly in their determinations of what actions fell within the
scope of the term "carry" as well.3 9 All the courts of appeals
eventually agreed that weapons in vehicles were "carried" under




"' Id. Under the Court's interpretation,
a firearm can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender has a gun on display
during a transaction, or barters with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be
carried without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing
throughout a drug transaction.
Id.
, Id. Applying its definition to the facts, the Court found that the evidence was in-
sufficient to uphold either defendant's conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c).
Id. at 151.
" See cases cited infra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
4o Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1916 (1998)
1999] 979
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The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits required a showing
of immediate availability of the firearm along with transport."
Transport meant that the defendant must have carried the fire-
arm "on or about his person," but in the case of automobiles,
the vehicle carried both the weapon and the defendant, satisfy-
ing the transport requirement.42  Under the Second Circuit's
analysis, "a person cannot be said to 'carry' a firearm without at
least a showing that the gun is within reach during the commis-
sion of the drug offense."43 The Ninth Circuit, after noting that
"circuits all over the map are all over the map on the issue,"
adopted a similar approach." The Sixth Circuit used a slightly
more expansive definition of "immediate availability," which in-
cluded a weapon "in a location where the defendant must make
some effort in order to retrieve it."
45
The Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, although requir-
ing availability of the weapon and transport in non-vehicular
cases, held that a gun could be "carried" in a vehicle without be-
ing immediately accessible. 6 The Seventh Circuit considered
the issue in United States v. Molina, which involved drugs and a
gun stored together in a secret compartment on the driver's-
" See United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding gun in
zipped bag under tarp cover in truck bed was not immediately available), vacated and
remanded, U.S. v. Foster, 119 S. Ct. 32 (1998); United States v. Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d
283, 286 (2nd Cir. 1996) (remanding case to determine whether gun hidden in car
dashboard was "accessible" to defendants); United States v. Riasco-Suarez, 73 F.3d
616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding gun must be "on the defendant or within his or her
reach" to be "carried"); see also Amy Sullivan Broadbent, Carrying on After Bailey v.
United States: Where Will the Supreme Court Go From Here?, 45 FED. LAw. 22, 24-25 (Apr.
1998).
42 Foster, 133 F.3d at 708.
43 Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d at 285 (quoting United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250,
253 (2d Cir. 1988)).
" Foster, 133 F.3d at 708.
4Blankenship v. United States, 117 F.3d 1420, (6th Cir. 1997). The court ex-
panded its earlier interpretation that the firearm needed to be "on the defendant or
within his or her reach." See Riasco-Suarez, 73 F.3d at 623. See also Broadbent, supra
note 41, at 24.
16 Broadbent, supra note 41, at 25. See United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 654
(4th Cir. 1997) (loaded gun in passenger compartment of vehicle was "carried");
United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant "carried" gun
stored with drugs in secret compartment of vehicle); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d
1244, 1261 (10 Cir. 1996) (gun located in back of van was "carried").
99]"CAFlG"A FRER
side wall of the back seat. The compartment contained elec-
tronic wiring, which led investigators to believe it could be
opened from the front seat.48 The court held that it "need not
conclude that the gun was within Molina's immediate reach" in
order to uphold the defendant's conviction. 9 Rather, the court
ruled that the movement of guns and drugs stored together in
an automobile satisfies the "in relation to" and "carry" prongs of
18 U.S.C. § 924.50 This view is consistent with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that "when a motor vehicle is used, 'carrying a
weapon' takes on a less restrictive meaning than carrying on the
person."5' The automobile "carries" the weapon, just as a de-
fendant's "hands or pocket" would carry a gun on the person.
Although it has not directly addressed the question, the
Eleventh Circuit has suggested that it would not have required
immediate accessibility either. 2 In United States v. Chirinos, the
court upheld a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) where one
of the defendants wore a pistol on the waistband of his pants,
and a rifle rested under the back seat of his car. 3 Because the
gun on the defendant's waistband clearly fell within the mean-
ing of carry, the court did not need to consider whether the ri-
fle in the car was also carried in violation of § 924.24 The court
required that the government prove transport of the gun, either
on the person or "in a vehicle," but it never mentioned "imme-
diate accessibility.,
55
The Third and Eighth Circuits had not clearly decided
whether § 924 (c) (1) requires immediate accessibility 6 The
17 Molina, 102 F.3d at 929.
Id. at 929-30.
45Id. at 932.
'0 Id. The court noted that if the gun and drugs were located in different places in
the car, the decision would hinge on the relation between the items (bringing into
play the "in relation to" element of§ 924(c) (1)). Id.
"' United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535-56 (10th Cir. 1989)).
12 Broadbent, supra note 41, at 25-26. See United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089,
1095-96 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 701(1998).
"Chirinos, 112 F.3d at 1093-94.
"Id. at 1095-96.
Id. at 1095.
Broadbent, supra note 41, at 26.
1999]
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Third Circuit has held that a defendant "carried" a gun which
was immediately accessible, but did not address whether an in-
accessible gun could likewise be "carried" under § 924.57 In
United States v. Nelson, the Eighth Circuit said that it would "as-
sume, without deciding" that it has an accessibility requirement,
and held that a gun behind the driver's seat was carried.5 8
The First and Fifth Circuits rendered their key decisions in-
terpreting the "carry" language in the two cases consolidated for
review in Muscarello.5 9 As discussed more fully below, neither
court required immediate accessibility of the weapon.6°
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. DEFENDANT FRANK MUSCARELLO
On December 8, 1994, Frank J. Muscarello delivered eight
pounds of marijuana to an undercover special agent of the Fed-
eral Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") in Louisiana.
61 Mus-
carello had negotiated the deal and received payment for the
drugs in his Ford pick-up truck.62 Federal agents arrested him
on the scene, at which point officers seized a .38 caliber hand-
gun locked in the glove compartment of Muscarello's truck.63
Muscarello had not removed the weapon from the glove com-
partment at any point during the drug sale.r
At the time of his arrest, Muscarello worked for the Tangi-
pahoa Parish Sheriffs office as a bailiff in the Twenty-first Judi-
cial District Courthouse.0 Since 1954, he had held "a variety of
law-enforcement positions," including constable and chief of
17 See United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 1997).
" United States v. Nelson, 109 F.3d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1997).
'9 Muscarello v. United States, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cleve-
land, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).
60 Muscarello, 106 F.3d at 638; Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1066. The decisions will be dis-
cussed at greater length infra, Part III.
" Brief for Petitioner at 2, Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998) (No.
96-1654); Muscarello v. United States, Crim.A. No. 95-2, 1996 WL 173374, at *1 (E.D.
La. Apr. 10, 1996), afftd, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997), afTd, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
"Brief for the United States at 3, Muscarello (Nos. 96-1654, 96-8837).
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Muscarello (No. 96-1654).
'4Muscarello, 1996 WL 173374, at *1.
"Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Muscarello (No. 96-1654).
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police.6 Muscarello claimed that he had kept the gun in his
glove compartment for "a long period of time" before his ar-
rest.
67
The government charged Muscarello with (1) conspiracy to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distribu-
tion of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); and (3)
"using and carrying" a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) . On May 25, 1995,
he pleaded guilty to all three counts in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.69 Muscarello based
his plea, in part, upon the following statement, prepared by the
government and signed by Muscarello's attorney: "Located in-
side the glove compartment of the defendant Muscarello's Ford
truck was a loaded firearm which the defendant knowing [sic]
possessed in his vehicle and carried for protection in relation to
the above described drug trafficking offense. 7 °
On December 6, 1995, before Muscarello had been sen-
tenced, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States,
7'
which narrowed the scope of the "use" language in 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1).72 Based on Bailey, Muscarello filed a motion in the
district court to quash or dismiss the § 924(c) charge against
him.73 Although the Government agreed that, after Bailey, Mus-
carello's conviction under § 924 would not stand if it was based
on the charge that he had "used" the firearm, the Government
argued that he had still "carried" the weapon. 74
6 & dat 2.
', Id. at 3 (quoting pre-sentence report).
"Id. at 2; Brief for the United States at 2, Muscarello (Nos. 96-1654, 96-8837).
6Brief for the United States at 2, Muscarello (Nos. 96-1654, 96-8837); Muscarello,
1996 WL 173374, at *1.70 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Muscarello (No. 96-1654).
71 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (holding a defendant must actively employ a weapon in
order to be subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) punishment under the "use" prong).
72 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Muscarello (No. 96-1654).






The district court dismissed the 18 U.S.C. § 924 charge
against Muscarello. 75 The court found that Muscarello did not
"knowingly possess the firearm in relation to the drug-
trafficking crime," but rather "knowingly possessed the firearm
in the glove compartment of his vehicle in furtherance of his
job requirements."76 The Government insisted that Muscarello
had admitted to carrying a firearm in his guilty plea. However,
the court stressed that the plea was a "pre Bailey [sic] considera-
tion by defendant and his counsel," and thus rejected the Gov-
ernment's motion for reconsideration. 7'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's de-
cision, reinstated the conviction for carrying a firearm, and re-
manded the case for sentencing.78  Relying on Circuit
precedent,79 the court stated that, "the carrying requirement of
§ 924(c) is met if the operator of the vehicle knowingly pos-
sesses the firearm in the vehicle during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime." ° According to the court, the district court
erred in two ways."' First, the district court erroneously disre-
garded Muscarello's statements in the plea agreement as a "pre
Bailey consideration. 82 Because Bailey addressed the use prong
of the statute, and Muscarello involved the carry prong, the plea
agreement should not have been ignored.83 Second, the district
court gave undue weight to Muscarello's "self-serving declara-
tion" in the pre-sentencing report ("PSR") that he carried the
gun in relation to his employment as a bailiff.4 In short, "the
court should not have allowed the PSR to supplant the formal
plea agreement."'
7s Muscarello v. United States, CrimA_ No. 95-2, 1996 WL 173374, at *2 (E.D. La.
April 10, 1996), aft'd, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
76 Id.
7 Id.; Brief for Petitioner, MuscareUo (No. 96-1654).
" Muscarello v. United States, 106 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1997), affd, 118 S. Ct.
1911 (1998).
United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 1992)
' Muscarello, 106 F.3d at 638 (quoting Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d at 104).
8 Id. at 638-39.




c "CARRY!NG" A FIREARM
On petition from Muscarello, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether "carries a firearm" under 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) includes guns located in the locked glove
compartment of a vehicle.88
B. DEFENDANTS DONALD CLEVELAND AND ENRIQUE GRAY-
SANTANA
On October 18, 1994, DEA agents arrested Donald Cleve-
land and Enrique Gray-Santana in connection with a drug
deal.87  The agents had been conducting surveillance on an
apartment in Connecticut, and had followed two cars (an Isuzu
Trooper and a Lexus) to Boston."' The driver of the Trooper
paged Cleveland and Gray-Santana, both of whom later arrived
in a Mazda.? The police observed a series of conversations
among the men, and watched them exit and reenter their cars.
When the vehicles began moving again, Gray-Santana was a pas-
senger in the Trooper, while Cleveland drove the Mazda. 90
After stopping them, agents searched both vehicles, and
found six kilograms of cocaine hidden in a compartment in the
Trooper.9' They also recovered firearms from the trunk of the
Mazda. 2 The weapons were all loaded, and two of them were
semiautomatic.93 The agents arrested Cleveland and Gray-
Santana, along with two other men, and brought them to DEA
headquarters. 94 Once there, Cleveland and Gray-Santana admit-
ted to placing the guns in the Mazda trunk earlier that day, and
T
6Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). The Court consolidated Mus-
carello, 106 F.3d 636, affd 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998), with United States v. Cleveland, 106
F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), affd 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
87 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998) (No.
96-8837).
" Id. at 2.
8 .at 2-4.
1 Id. at 3.
911&
Brief for the United States at 7, Muscarello (Nos. 96-1654, 96-8837).




to arranging the drug deal.95 They explained that they obtained
the guns in order to steal the drugs, rather than buy them. 6
On March 15, 1995, a federal grand jury indicted Cleveland
and Gray-Santana 9 7 In July, 1995, they pled guilty to "(1) at-
tempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and (2) us-
ing and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime."98  Each defendant was sentenced to 180
months imprisonment and five years of supervised release.9 Af-
ter the Supreme Court decided Bailey in December, 1995, the
defendants challenged the second count.1 ° The trial court sus-
tained the conviction, and agreed with the Government that the
defendants had "carried" the guns within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 924 by having them in the trunk of the Mazda."°
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. 02 The court consid-
ered the following two questions: "[f]irst, must a firearm be on a
suspect's person to be 'carried' or can one also 'carry' a firearm
in a vehicle? Second, if one can 'carry' a firearm in a vehicle,
must the weapon be immediately accessible to the defendant to
be 'carried'?' '0 3  In regard to the first question, the majority
based its decision on one of its earlier, post-Bailey decisions,
United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer1°4 There, the court held that a gun
could be "carried" in a boat.'05 The Cleveland majority reasoned
that the result from Ramirez was consistent with both its pre-
95 Id.
96 md
97 Id. at 4.
98Id.
" Brief for the United States at 2-3, Muscarello v. United States, (Nos. 96-1654, 96-
8837).
' ' Id. at 7-8. Gray-Santana filed a Motion to Correct Sentence and/or for Other
Appropriate Relief pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Cleveland
brought a challenge after his sentencing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and on direct
appeal. Id.
'0' Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Muscarello (No. 96-8837).
2 United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 1069 (1st Cir. 1997), aff'd 118 S. Ct.
1911 (1998).
o Id. at 1065.
... Id. (citing United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer 82 F.3d 1149 (1st Cir. 1996)).
"'5 Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1154.
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Bailey decisions interpreting "carry" and with post-Bailey deci-
sions from other circuits.'06
Next, the court addressed the novel issue of whether the
gun needed to be immediately accessible to be "carried. 1 °7 The
majority held, consistent with the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits, "that a gun may be 'carried' in a vehicle for the pur-
poses of § 924 (c) (1) without necessarily being immediately ac-
cessible to the defendant while it is being transported.' '18 While
recognizing that other circuits had reached the opposite con-
clusion,' 9 the court reasoned:
We strongly doubt-given the omnipresence of automobiles in today's
world and in drug dealing, and given the basic meaning of 'carry' as in-
cluding transport by vehicle-that Congress... meant to exclude a de-
fendant who transports the gun in his car, rather than on his person, for
use in a drug transaction." 0
The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the "distin-
guishing characteristic" of the "carry" element was not immedi-
ate accessibility, but "the fact that the item is being moved from
one place to another by the carrier, either personally, or with
the aid of some appropriate vehicle.""'
On petition from the defendants, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari 2 to consider whether "carries a firearm" un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) "is limited to the carrying of firearms
on the person."' 3
"6 Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1065-66 (citing cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
Id. at 1066.
log Id.
'" d. at 1068.
" Id at 1067.
"' Id. at 1068 (citing United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 1996)).
"' Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). The court consolidated the
case with Muscarello v. United States, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997).
"' Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913 (1998).
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions
of the First and Fifth Circuits." Writing for the majority, Justice
Breyer ruled that both the statutory language and Congressional
history demonstrate that the proper definition of "carry" under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) covers guns locked in the glove compart-
ment or trunk of a vehicle, regardless of whether the guns were
immediately accessible."5
The Court first analyzed the definition of "carry" at great
length ." It found that there were two relevant definitions of
carry-one used to refer to carrying guns "in a wagon, car,
truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies," and another
meaning: the "bearing" of a gun."7 The Court examined nu-
merous English dictionaries, literary sources, prior opinions,
and newspapers for their use of the term "carry."" Within these
sources, the Court found that "carry" frequently referred to car-
rying items in a car, and that there was "nothing linguistically
special about the fact that weapons, rather than drugs, are being
carried.""' 9 Based on this analysis, the majority concluded that
"the word 'carry' in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car
and that the word, used in its ordinary sense, keeps the same
meaning whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana." "O
Looking next at Congressional intent, the majority con-
cluded that "neither the statute's basic purpose nor its legisla-
tive history support circumscribing the scope of the word 'carry'
11 Id. at 1920.
.Id. at 1914-16. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomasjoined injus-
tice Breyer's opinion.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1914. In colloquial language, the second definition would be "packing a
gun." Id. at 1915.
"8.Among the sources considered by the majority were the Oxford English Dictionay,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, the King
James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, Moby Dick, the New York Times, and Westlaw's "US News"
database. Id. at 1914-15.
i at 1915.
'2 Id. at 1916.
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by applying an 'on the person' limitation.', 121 The Court pointed
out that the chief sponsor of the statute, Representative Richard
Poff, stated that the goal was to "persuade the man who is
tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.' 22
In light of this goal, the Court reasoned that it would be non-
sensical for the statute to punish individuals who walk with a
123gun, but not similarly punish those who drive with a gun.
The Court disagreed with the defendants' assertion that a
definition of "carry" that includes guns in cars equates the word
"carry' with "transport."124  The defendants argued that Con-
gress had used the word "transport" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(b),
which penalized one who "transports" a weapon with intent to
commit a crime. 2 Had Congress intended to reach the same
activity in § 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), defendants argued, it would
have used the term "transport," rather than "carries.' '126 The
Court reasoned, however, that while carry "implies personal
agency and some degree of possession," the term "transport"
implies "the movement of goods in bulk over great distances.
' 127
In addition, the Court pointed out that Congress added an ex-
emption in 18 U.S.C. § 926A for one who carries a firearm from
one place to another, when he may lawfully possess it in both
places. 8 In § 926A, Congress specifically declined to exempt
"the 'transportation' of a firearm if it is 'readily accessible or is
121 id.
'2Id. (quoting 114 CONG. REc. H22231 (daily ed. July 19, 1968) (statement of Rep.
Poff)).
121 Id. at 1917.
'2 Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911
(1998) (No. 96-8837).
126 Id.
Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1917. The Court explained the difference as follows:
If Smith, for example, calls a parcel delivery service, which sends a truck to Smith's
house to pick up Smith's package and take it to Los Angeles, one might say that Smith
has shipped the package and the parcel delivery service has transported the package.
But only the truck driver has 'carried' the package in the sense of 'carry' that we believe
Congress intended. Therefore, 'transport' is a broader category that includes 'carry'
but also encompasses other activity.
Id.
128 Id. at 1917-18.
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directly accessible from the passenger compartment of [the]
transporting vehicle."'''  If the dissent were correct that to
"carry a firearm" in a vehicle means to have it immediately ac-
cessible, then "[t]he statute simply could have said that such a
person may not 'carry' a firearm. But, of course, Congress did
not say this because that is not what 'carry' means.130
The Court also refuted the defendants' argument that since
the Court construed the term "use" narrowly in Bailey,'3' it
should give "carry" a similarly limited meaning in this case.1
32
The Court drew a distinction between the two terms; although a
broad definition of "use" would have "swallowed up" the term
carry, the opposite is not true of a broad definition of "carry."'33
One can still "carry" a gun in a car and not "use" it, so long as
there is no "active employment."' 34 If the Court construed both
"use" and "carry" narrowly, they would "remove the act of carry-
ing a gun in a car entirely from the statute's reach, leaving a gap
in coverage" not intended by Congress, thus "undercutting the
statute's basic objective.
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that its defi-
nition of "carry" would extend the scope of the statute to weap-
ons stored in luggage on buses, planes, or ships. The "during"
and "in relation to" language of the statute would properly limit
the application of the statute to drug crimes.
The Court rejected a definition of "carry" requiring that a
firearm be "immediately accessible," on the grounds that nei-
ther the statutory language nor legislative history supported that
standard.' 3 The Court noted that "nothing in the statute's his-
tory suggests that Congress intended that limitation;" therefore,
" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 926A (1994)).
'30 Id. at 1918.
"' Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).





' Id. at 1919.
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"one 'carries' a gun in the glove compartment whether or not
that glove compartment is locked.""s
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the statute was
so ambiguous as to require a decision in the defendants' favor
based on the "rule of lenity.'0" It explained that it need not in-
voke the rule unless the Court could make "no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended."4 ' The Court asserted that
no "grievous ambiguity" existed here. It explained that the
Court confronts the level of statutory interpretation that it did
in Muscarello in many of its criminal cases, and has never held
that it "automatically permits a defendant to win."4
In sum, the Court concluded that the "generally accepted
contemporary meaning" of "carry" and the purpose of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 support the holding that the word "carry" includes the
carrying of guns in a vehicle. 4 Thus, the defendants "carried a
firearm" under § 924 (c) (1).'4
B. JUSTICE GINSBERG'S DISSENT
In dissent, Justice Ginsberg46 argued that the proper defini-
tion of "carry" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) refers to "bearing
[firearms] in such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon.'4 7
She explained that § 924 functions as a penalty enhancement
provision: if the defendants were not punished under § 924,
they would still be subject to penalty enhancement under the
Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, a narrow reading of the statute
would not result in leaving criminals unpunished.
49
139 Id.
', Id. The rule of lenity would require the Court to resolve the ambiguity in favor
of the defendants. I&.
,4, Id. (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (quoting Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64 (1995)).
" Id (citation omitted).
143 i.
144 1
"' I& at 1919-20.
"6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Souterjoined in the dissent.
,47 Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1920 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1920-21 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). The Sentencing Guidelines, under 28
U.S.C. § 994 (1994), provide for a two-level enhancement for firearm possession con-
nected with a drug offense. In Muscarello's case, the enhancement would be an extra
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The dissent rejected the Court's assertion that literature,
newspapers, and dictionaries can dispositively interpret the
meaning of "carry" within 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) .15  However, it
countered the Court's analysis with its-own examination of
newspapers, the bible, dictionaries, books, political speeches,
and popular television and film productions. 5' As a result of
this research, the dissent concluded that "'carry' is a word
commonly used to convey various messages," and that "[s]uch
references, given their variety, are not reliable indicators of what
Congress meant, in § 924(c) (1), by 'carries a firearm.",
152
The dissent argued that possessing a gun in a car is no more
dangerous than possessing a gun at the location of a drug sale,
if it were, for example, hidden in a closet.153  It reasoned that
Congress intended to provide mandatory minimum sentences
"for the most lifejeopardizing gun-connection cases," and to
have the "less imminently threatening situations" governed by
more flexible guidelines.154 In Justice Ginsberg's view, the stat-
ute should apply to situations where the "firearm was kept so
close to a person as to approximate placement in a pocket or
four months of prison time. Id. at 1921. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2D1.1(a) (3) (Nov. 1995).
"' Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1920-21 (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
... Id. at 1921-22 (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
.. Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Among the sources examined by the dissent were
Black's Law Dictionay, The Chicago Tribune, The New English Bible, The New Jerusalem Bi-
ble, The Poetical Works of Oliver Goldsmith, Rudyard Kipling's Verse, Bartlett's Familiar Quota-
tions, The Magnificent Seven and M*A*S*H. Id. It quoted M*A*S*H's Hawkeye Pierce:
I will not carry a gun ... I'll carry your books, I'll carry a torch, I'll carry a tune, I'll carry
on, carry over, carry forward, Gary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia,
I'll even 'har-kar' if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!
Id. at 1922 (quoting <http:// www.Geocities.com / Hollywood / 8915 /
mashquotes.html>).
,12 Id. (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
1I11d. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 707
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1818 (1998)) ("A drug dealer who packs heat is more
likely to hurt someone or provoke someone else to violence. A gun in a bag under a
tarp in a truck bed poses substantially less risk")
'-" Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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holster, e.g., guns carried at one's side in a briefcase or handbag,
or strapped to the saddle of a horse.' ' 5
According to the dissent, the majority relied too heavily on
the legislative statements regarding the desire to convince a
would-be felon to "leave his gun at home.' 56  The dissent
pointed out that Representative Poff's next sentence was that
"[a]ny such person should understand that if he uses his gun
and is caught and convicted, he is going to jail.' 5 7 Therefore,
Justice Ginsberg concluded that the congressman's statement
referred to the "use," not the carry, prong of the statute.
58
The dissent also analyzed Congress's use of the word "trans-
port" in other statutes to refute the Court's contention that
49carry"~ implies personal agency, while "transport" implies mov-
ing bulk goods. 59 justice Ginsberg explained that Congress of-
ten interchanged the two terms, and "sometimes employed
'transports' when, according to the Court, 'carries' was the right
word to use."'' Referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 925(a) (2) (B) 6' and
926A!62 as examples, the dissent concluded that interpreting
. Id. at 1922 n.7 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).
11
6 Id. at 1924 n.12 (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
'7 Id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting 114 CONG REC. H22231 (daily ed. July 19,
1968) (statement of Rep. Poff).
Id. (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
"'Id. at 1923-24 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).
"0 Id. at 1923 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
' 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (2)(B) exempts from criminal penalties "the transportation
of [a] . . . firearm or ammunition carried out to enable a person, who lawfully re-
ceived such a firearm or ammunition from the Secretary of the Army, to engage in
military training or in competitions." Id.
162 In pertinent part, § 926A provides that:
... any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter... from transporting,
shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful
purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any
other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such trans-
portation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being
transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compart-
ment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a com-
partment separate from the driver's compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be
contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console.
I& Justice Ginsberg (when refuting the Court's differentiation of "carry" and "trans-
port") argued that the statute illustrated that Congress used the term "transport"
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"carry" under § 924 to mean "on or about [one's] person" is
fully compatible with the other statutes."
Lastly, the dissent argued that because 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1) is "not decisively clear one way or the other," the
Court should have applied the rule of lenity and resolved its
doubt in favor of the defendants.'r One of the core reasons for
the rule of lenity, explained Justice Ginsberg, is to ensure that
legislatures, not courts, define criminal activity.1'5
V. ANALYSIS
In Muscarello, the Supreme Court correctly held that the
"carries a firearm" language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) covers
guns transported in vehicles.16 6 The statutory language of § 924
and its legislative history support the Court's conclusion. An al-
ternative holding would have frustrated congressional intent by
severely limiting the reach of § 924. Although judicially correct,
Muscarello results in a double standard for drug transactions tak-
ing place in vehicles and those occurring in houses. An
amendment to replace "uses or carries a firearm" with "pos-
sesses a firearm" would result in a more consistent and effective
application of the law.
A. THE COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED MUSCARELLO v. UNITED
STATES BASED ON STATUTORY LANGUAGE, LEGISLATIVE INTENT,
AND THE RULE OF LENITY.
Analysis of dictionary definitions and contemporary uses of
the word "carry" illustrate that the term can be used in many
ways. Justice Ginsberg concluded in her dissenting opinion that
"the Court's lexicological sources demonstrate vividly that
'carry' is a word commonly used to convey various messages.
Such references, given their variety, are not reliable indicators
of what Congress meant, in § 924 (c) (1), by 'carries a fire-
when it attempted to "imply personal agency and some degree of possession." Id. at
1923 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1924 (GinsbergJ., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).





arm."1 67 The majority concluded that the phrase "carries" in-
cludes the transportation of guns in vehicles' 1s Given the multi-
tude of possible definitions for "carry," dictionaries and similar
tools shed little light on the meaning of the term within 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). However, looking to the legislative intent
behind the statute, there is no evidence that Congress intended
to limit "carry" to exclude one of its possible meanings-trans-
porting in an automobile.16 9
Reading § 924 (c) (1) to reach guns located in vehicles is en-
tirely consistent with legislative intent.1 70 The clear purpose of §
924 is to combat violence in drug crimesY.17  As the Court noted
in Smith v. United States.
When Congress enacted the current version of § 924(c) (1), it was no
doubt aware that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination. In 1989,
56 percent of all murders in NewYork City were drug related; during the
same period, the figure for the Nation's Capital was as high as 80 per-
cent.1
When introducing the 1986 amendment, Senator D'Amato
spoke of "threatening public safety."173 Representative Poff re-
ferred to the need to persuade a criminal "to leave his gun at
home.''
As the Court correctly noted, there is "no significant indica-
tion elsewhere in the legislative history of any more narrowly fo-
17 ld. at 1922 (Ginsberg,J., dissenting).
'68 Id. at 1914-16.
"6 Id. at 1916-17.
'7 Id. at 1916.
171 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993).
7 Id. Drugs and violence remain intertwined; a 1997 study by the Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority found that "as crack emerged and seizure quantities
began to climb, there was a concomitant and parallel increase in firearms offenses."
William Recktenwald, Police Tactics, Sentencing Take Toll, Report Finds; Study Probes Drop
in State Violence, Ci-cAGO TRB., May 26, 1997, Metro Northwest, at P1. See also, Whit-
ing supra note 13, at 719 (survey of 2000 convicted felons showed that "forty-three to
forty-five percent were armed with a weapon during a drug deal and twenty-nine per-
cent fired a gun at someone during a drug deal") (citation omitted).
177 SeeFirearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a) (2) (A)-
(E), 100 Stat. 449, 456-57 (1986), discussed supra note 17.
"' 114 CONG. REC. H22231 (daily ed. July 19, 1968) (statement of Rep. Poff).
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cused relevant purpose."1 7 If anything more specific than a
general goal of combating violence can be found in the state-
ments, it is a particular concern about violence in the public
realm-violence that threatens "public" safety and takes place
outside of the home. Given these concerns, it is logical that
Congress intended to reach situations like those raised in Mus-
carello, which brought guns outside of the home and endan-
gered public safety. Therefore, the Court's ruling properly
interpreted and furthered congressional intent.
The Court also properly held that the rule of lenity did not
apply in Muscarello.'7 The dissent argued that "[t]he sharp divi-
sion in the Court" regarding the proper interpretation of "car-
ries" proved "that the issue is subject to some doubt" and should
therefore be "resolved in favor of the defendant.' 77 The Court's
decision is consistent with its refusal to apply the rule of lenity in
Smith v. United States.178 If the dissent's view were adopted, every
five to four opinion issued by the Court would potentially be
subject to the rule of lenity. The rule properly applies only
when the Court can make "no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended."' 79 Here, the legislative history offers insight
int6 Congress's general goal of reducing violence in drug
crimes. Considering this goal, as well as the statutory language
analysis, the Court had much more than "a guess" as to the
reach of the carry language. Therefore, it correctly declined to
apply the rule of lenity.' s°
B. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE "IMMEDIATE
AVAILABILITY' STANDARD
The Court properly rejected the "immediate availability"
test employed by the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. '8' 18
'7 3Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (1998).
76 Id. at 1919.
'77Id. at 1924 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1978)).
'78 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239-40 (1993).
79 Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1919 (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499
(1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995))).
l aO
,' Id.; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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U.S.C. § 926A, cited by the dissent, refers to firearms and am-
munition in a vehicle being "readily accessible" or "directly ac-
cessible. ' 82 Section 926A demonstrates that if Congress had
wanted to, it could have included the accessibility standard in 18
U.S.C. § 924. However, as currently written, § 924 contains no
such language.
The immediate accessibility standard raises a number of
practical difficulties as well. In Bailey, the Court posed a series
of questions that illustrated complications in determining
whether a firearm was immediately available: "How 'at the
ready' was the firearm? Within arm's reach? In the room? In
the house? How long before the confrontation did he place it
there? Five minutes or twenty-four hours?"'3 In the context of
automobiles, one can easily foresee similar questions arising:
How close to the passenger was the firearm? Was it in a locked
compartment? Did the ignition need to be turned off before us-
ing a key to unlock the compartment? Did the defendant need
to get out of the car first, as with guns stored in the trunk? Was
the weapon within reach of multiple passengers? Which pas-
senger placed the weapon in the vehicle? As one author noted,
"courts that continue to adhere to a requirement of immediate
availability may be forced to resort to increasingly arbitrary line
drawing and other lines of reasoning in order to free themselves
from an 'availability' corner."184
By holding that guns in vehicles are, by definition, "carried,"
the Court avoided these line drawing problems. In essence, the
Court drew a line large enough to encompass all firearms lo-
cated in vehicles in relation to a drug crime.
C. THE COURT'S OPINION CREATES A DOUBLE STANDARD FOR
AUTOMOBILES
Under the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (as in-
terpreted by the Court), with the exception of drug crimes
committed in automobiles, guns that are not being "actively
employed" or physically carried on the person will not be coy-
See supra note 163.
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149 (1995).
'8 4Broadbent, supra note 41, at 27.
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ered under the statute."5 A gun in a locked glove compartment
or in the trunk will be "carried," and will thus be punished un-
der the statute. 6 However, a gun hidden near a person during
a drug crime, in a home or any other non-vehicular context, will
not be "carried."18 7 Cases not covered under the "carry" prong
could be considered under the "use" prong. The situations
would be subject to the "use" analysis of Bailey. Under Bailey,
unless the defendant "actively employs" the weapon, he will not
be subject to the penalty enhancement of § 924.'8
For example, in United States v. Moore,'9 a defendant found
asleep in a bedroom with four immediately accessible weapons
escaped a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924 on the grounds that
he had not "transported" the weapons.'90 The case caused at
least one scholar to ask (pre-Muscarello), "what if Moore had
been discovered sleeping in a vehicle parked in his driveway
which contained guns and drugs?"19' After Muscarello, the de-
fendant might be convicted under § 924 (on the theory that
firearms in a vehicle are considered "carried") .192 The disparate
treatment of the two situations seems illogical, as well as unjust.
One possible justification for the harsher treatment is that
carrying a gun in a car brings firearms into- the public domain;
"[i]f the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) is to reduce danger to
society.., perhaps drug selling which occurs on the streets and
out among the public warrants harsher sanctions than selling
from a private residence in light of its higher attendant risk."9 -3
," See generally Gilbert, supra note 14, at 856 ("Astute statutory construction, how-
ever, should not yield punishment under the statute in situations where a gun is
merely stored in proximity to a drug transaction and is accessible during that transac-
tion.") (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)).
'6 Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913-14 (1998).
187 See e.g. United States v. Moore, 76 F.3d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1996).
"3 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).
' 8 Moore, 76 F.3d at 111.
"o Id. See Broadbent, supra note 41, at 27.
.. Broadbent, supra note 41, at 27.
" See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1913-14 (1998). The result in a
case with a defendant sleeping in a car is not certain. It is possible that the Court
could hold that a defendant sleeping in a vehicle had not "carried a firearm" if the
drugs and guns never actually moved. Muscarelo involved a defendant "who know-
ingly possesse [d] and convey[ed]" firearms. Id. (emphasis added).
9 Broadbent, supra note 41, at 28.
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This view could be seen as consistent with Representative Poffs
statement about convincing criminals to leave their guns at
home.'94 Under this reasoning, although both situations are
undesirable and dangerous, it makes sense that a penalty-
enhancement provision should impose stricter sentencing for
the act that endangers the public welfare.95
There are a number of problems with this argument, how-
ever. The current interpretation of the statute not only creates
a dichotomy between the punishment for using or carrying guns
in cars and using or carrying guns in houses-it also results in
different treatment for drug deals conducted on street corners,
in the woods, or on front lawns as well. Having guns in these
situations would endanger public safety just as much as, if not
more than, transactions occurring within automobiles. How-
ever, unless the gun was "actively employed" or physically car-
ried, the defendant would be free from the punishment of 18
U.S.C. § 924.
Additionally, the idea that drug deals that take place in
homes are free from the public domain is unrealistic. Children
and innocent parties are likely to be present in homes or build-
ings where drugs and violence mix.'9 Harsher treatment for
guns in the public realm may merely push firearms into homes,
rather than eliminating their use. It may also suggest that those
who enter homes where drugs are sold are not worthy of protec-
tion or statutory concern. At least one author has suggested
that the policy may be motivated by a desire to "keep undesir-
able members of society stationary, i.e. where the drugs are-
presumably in lower income areas, and to discourage migration
to other more affluent neighborhoods.' ' 7  The idea that this
'" 114 CONG. REC. H22231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff); see also 131 CONG. REC
S16903 (1985) (Sen. D'Amato proposed amendment to add narcotics crimes to § 924
(c) (1) "to guarantee that we treat drug trafficking as seriously as we do other armed
felonies threatening public safety." (emphasis added); 132 CONG. REc. S7941
(1986) (Sen. Bumpers explained that the statute was working "to keep many danger-
ous defendants off the streets while awaiting trial") (emphasis added).
'9 5Broadbent, supra note 41, at 28.
' In a CBS News/New York Times poll conducted in April, 1998, 15% of teenag-
ers polled said they owned their own gun, 38% said someone else in their house
owned one, and 60% claimed to know how to use a gun. Reuters, Poll- Volence, Drugs
are Top Teen Worries, O..A.NDo SENTINEL, April 30, 1998, at A9.
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other more affluent neighborhoods. 1 97 The idea that this moti-
vated Congress to pass the statute seems unlikely, but it may well
be an unintended effect.
The manner in which 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) is currently ap-
plied, although correct from a judicial standpoint, is illogical in
practice. Not only does the statute suffer from an inconsistency
in its application to different locations (non-vehicular and ve-
hicular), but it lacks realistic effectiveness as well. By failing to
reach guns hidden nearby during a drug deal, the statute misses
exactly what it is intended to punish; "[t] he typical drug transac-
tion does not occur with each party holding the other at gun-
point." 198 Rather, guns are more likely to be kept nearby, where
they can easily reached when necessary. If visible, the guns may
be said to have been "used" under the definition ("active em-
ployment") in Bailey, which included the brandishing of a gun
so as to facilitate the crime.'9 However, if hidden in a cabinet
or drawer, the guns would not fall under § 924 liability as the
statute is currently interpreted.
D. "POSSESSION" AMENDMENT WOULD ELIMINATE DOUBLE
STANDARD
In response to the difficulty interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1), legislators have proposed a number of amendments
over the years that would alter the statutory language to replace
"uses or carries" with "possesses. '' 200 Unlike "use" or "carry," pos-
session would apply to situations in which the gun is not physi-
cally on a defendant's person, or necessarily within his/her
SeeBroadbent, supra note 41, at 28.
"' See Kesselman, supra note 22, at 559. Kesselman argues that the Supreme
Court's definition of "active uses" in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) should
have included guns hidden within the immediate reach of the perpetrator. Id- at 559-
60.
"' See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Ramos, 147
F.3d 281, 285 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding that firearms laid on table during drug transac-
tion satisfied "use" prong of § 924(c) (1)).
' See, e.g., H.R. 810, 105th Cong. § 2123 (1997) (Anti-Gang and Youth Violence
Control Act of 1997) (striking "uses or carries a firearm" and replacing it with "pos-
sesses a firearm"); H.R. 3155, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (adding a penalty en-
hancement for one who "possesses a firearm" "during and in relation to" a drug
crime). See generally Whiting, supra note 13, at 689-90.
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reach.20' Thus, a "defendant keeping a gun in the bedside table
or in a closet with drugs would receive the same punishment as
a defendant who puts a gun in the change compartment of a car
during a drug transaction."2 2 Both will be found to have pos-
sessed the weapon.
The term "possesses" will of course raise some line-drawing
problems of its own. The same criticisms expressed in regard to
the immediately availability standard could apply.23 However,
courts frequently apply the term "possession" in the context of
narcotics offenses, as well as other firearms statutes, and thus
have an established standard to use.204
"Possession" would likely be construed by a court to include
not only "actual possession," but "constructive possession" as
well.2 5 In United States v. Rogers, the First Circuit found no error
in the following jury instructions defining possession:
The term "possess" as used in [§ 922(g)] is not necessarily equated with legal
ownership of the firearm here at issue. The law recognizes two kinds of
possession, actual possession and constructive possession. A person who
knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then
said to be in actual possession of that thing. A person who, although not
in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, or to exercise do-
minion or control over the area in which that thing is found, whether di-
"' See Tonya Swackhamer, Note, Smith v. United States: The Supreme Court Defines
Use, 20 OmIo N.U.L. REv. 1093, 1100 (1994) (citing United States v. Torres-Medina,
935 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1991)).
SeeWhiting, supra note 13, at 721.
2" See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. Constructive possession, dis-
cussed infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text, would answer most of these ques-
tions. Under that standard, a defendant would probably possess the weapon
regardless of how close the passenger was to the firearm, whether it was in a locked
glove compartment, and whether the defendant needed to go to the trunk to obtain
it. The questions regarding multiple passengers, and who placed the firearm in the
vehicle, would be considered with regard to ownership, control, and dominion over
the weapon. See United States v. Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Zavala Maldarado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1994)).
' See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1991); Rogers,
41 F.3d at 25.
"' See Rogers, 41 F.3d at 29 ("Under settled law, 'possession' includes not merely the
state of... hands-on physical possession but also 'constructive' possession") (quoting
United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1994).
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rectly or through another person, is then in constructive possession of
the thing
2 0 6
A shorter, commonly used definition of constructive posses-
sion is "the power and intention to exercise control, or domin-
ion and control, over an object not in one's 'actual'
possession. 20 7
Although the "possession" standard appears to be similar to
"immediate availability," when applied the two terms work quite
differently. For example, in United States v. Tortes-Medina, the
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant "possessed" narcotics
when he had them hidden in a tunnel beneath his house, even
though the defendant was a paraplegic, in a wheelchair, and
could not get in the tunnel to retrieve them himself.208 The
same charge would likely fail under an immediate availability
standard, given the location of the gun and the considerable ef-
fort required to retrieve it.
Some may argue that constructive possession is overly broad
for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924. It could include a firearm
"while it is hidden at home in a bureau drawer, or while held by
an agent, or even while it is secured in a safe deposit box at the
bank.',2°9 In order to prevent the statute from overreaching,
Congress could consider specifically providing that § 924 cover
only "actual possession" of a firearm. This would limit the stat-
ute to reach only those firearms that a defendant has "direct
physical control over ... at a given time. 21 0
2'6 Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
217 Id. (quoting Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d at 7).
STorres-Medina, 935 F.2d at 1050. The court also held that the defendant violated
the "use" prong of § 924 by having a firearm stored with the drugs. Assuming that
someone (a witness who had testified to assisting the defendant in drug deals) could
withdraw the gun for him, the court found that the gun was "available" to him, and
thus "emboldened him in the commission of his crime." Id. at 1050. This analysis is
probably incorrect after Bailey. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).
0 Rogers, 41 F.3d at 29 n.2 (quoting Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d at 7).
2'0 Id. at 30. To maintain the result reached in Muscarello, a court would probably
need to apply a constructive possession standard, rather than actual possession (since
the defendants stored the guns in the trunk, and needed considerable effort to re-
trieve them). Congress could specifically apply constructive possession to vehicles,
but if actual possession were applied elsewhere, that would create an equally prob-
lematic double standard.
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However, the "actual possession" limitation would raise the
same practical difficulties as the immediate availability stan-
dard.21 With constructive possession, courts will still be drawing
lines, but they will be the same lines that they draw for narcotics
and gun possession statutes all the time. The statute would
reach many more situations involving the mix of guns and
drugs, and would become infinitely more effective.
Focusing on the "in relation to" language of the statute
would allay the fear that "possession" could punish the posses-
sion of guns incidentally in proximity to a crime, and "instances
where the gun is stored in the home for some legitimate pur-
pose."2  Careful scrutiny of the "in relation to" element "will
ensure that possession unrelated to the illegal conduct will not
be punished."1 3 Situations where firearms "'played' no part in
the crime" will be free from § 924 liability.2 4 Thus, individuals
would be protected from unfair sentence-enhancement when
their firearms have truly performed no role in the drug crime.
Some might argue that mandatory sentences, in general, are
not be the most effective way to combat crime. According to
the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 1984 and 1994,
"the number of convicts admitted each year to the nation's state
and federal prisons grew by 120 percent, from 246,260 [in
1984] to 541,434 [in 1994]. The taxpayer's bill for corrections
also more than doubled, to $31.5 billion., 215 Yet the problem of
drugs and violence in our country has hardly disappeared. By
some estimates, "there is a gun for every man, women and child
" See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
2 See Whiting, supra note 13, at 720.
2I3 Id-
21 Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998). The "in relation to"
requirement does create some oddities of its own. Defendants who could show that
they carried their guns for purposes other than the drug offense would be more likely
to escape punishment than those who carried guns only during the crime. So, in es-
sence, carrying a gun more often could benefit a crafty defendant. In oral arguments
before the Supreme Court in Muscarello, the defendant's attorney was asked: "So it
follows from your analysis that the informed drug dealer.., will have a gun in his car
at all times, when he goes shopping, when he goes to church, and when he distributes
the drugs." United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 11-12, Muscarello
(Nos. 96-1654, 96-8837).
2" David Anderson, Retribution vs. Intervention, STAR-TRiBUNE (Minneapolis-St.
Paul),June 5, 1997, at 24A.
1999] 1003
'SUPREME COURT REVIEW
in America." 216 Mandatory sentencing conflicts with our ideal vi-
sion of a criminal justice system that looks to every defendant's
individual problems, needs, and deservedness of punishment
before fashioning a sentence. However, given the docket load
in our court system, and the degree to which guns and drugs
remain inexorably linked, mandatory sentences may currently
be the only way to decrease gun use in the drug trade.
There are strong policy arguments for expanding the reach
of 18 U.S.C. § 924 to cover guns hidden nearby during a drug
transaction in a non-vehicular environment. Many of these ar-
guments were raised in support of expanding the scope of the
"use" definition before (and as criticism after) Bailey v. United
States. 7 As one author wrote, "in an 'imminent confrontation'
case the weapon could be discharged at any moment... [I] t is
hard to rationalize how the drug dealer in an 'imminent con-
frontation case' does not increase the danger to society even
more so than in Smith."2 8 The Supreme Court declined to ex-
tend the definition of "use" in Bailey to cover such situations,1 9
and as currently written and interpreted by the Court, the
"carry" phrase will not reach them either. A gun hidden in a
nearby cabinet is in no way being "carried." If Congress wants
to reach these cases, it must amend § 924.
Amending 18 U.S.C. § 924 to cover cases of "possession"
would provide for a more efficient and consistent application of
the penalty-enhancement provisions of the statute. A Congres-
sional amendment would greatly increase the effectiveness of §
924: "A uniform standard would send a clear signal to take the
guns away from the drug crime by raising the cost to a level
which might affect a defendant's decision to carry or use a gun
during the transaction. 22' Not every defendant will rationally
216 Evan Moore, Most Guns Start With Legal Sale, SEATrLE PosT-INTELLIGENCER, Octo-
ber 21, 1997, at Al.
217 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
218 See Kesselman, supra note 22, at 560. "Imminent confrontation" is used to refer
to cases in which the gun is hidden within immediate reach during a drug transac-
tion. Id. at 559.
219 See generally Gilbert, supra note 14.
-Whiting, supra note 13, at 721. See also Broadbent, supra note 41, at 28 (citing
United States v. Malcuit, 104 F.3d 880, 886, (6th Cir. 1997) (§ 924(c) (1) did not apply
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consider this cost, but as long as "a gun is as easy to get as a pack
of cigarettes,"22 ' amending § 924 may be Congress's most viable
alternative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly decided Muscarello v. United
States, holding that the "carry" language of 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c) (1) reaches firearms "carried" in vehicles in relation to drug
trafficking crimes.222 The statutory language and legislative his-
tory of the provision supported the Court's interpretation. The
Court reasoned correctly when it rejected the "immediate avail-
ability" standard used by a number of circuits, which went be-
yond the language of the statute.
However, the Court's decision in Muscarello does create a
double standard: drug transactions involving firearms in auto-
mobiles will be punished more frequently than in non-vehicular
cases. Muscarello significantly broadened the scope of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (c) (1) after a narrow holding in Bailey. However, Mus-
carello does not preclude the need to amend the statute.22 As
the statute currently stands, firearms hidden nearby during a
drug transaction in a dwelling will not be punished, while a gun
locked away in the trunk of a car will. Amending § 924 to re-
place "uses or carries a firearm" with "possesses a firearm" will
eliminate this double standard and expand the statute's cover-
age to effectively combat violence in drug crimes.
Lynn Marsella
to defendant who conducted drug transaction in his car with guns in the backseat,
when evidence showed his father had given him the gun that day for protection of his
new home)).
221 See Moore, supra note 216, at Al (quoting 34-year-old murderer Evan Jean Lol-
less, who is currently serving a life sentence).
118 S. Ct 1911 (1998).
2' Legislators and commentators alike have been suggesting the amendment for
years. See supra note 200; Bettenhausen, supra note 22, at 715 ("overhaul of § 924
(c) (1) is needed.. .."); Whiting, supra note 13, at 722 ("legislature should amend the
statute to replace the 'carrying' or 'using' of a gun under § 924(c) with 'possession' of
a gun during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense...").
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